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Book Review
How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA. By The Honorable Richard Neely.
New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1981. Pp. xvii,
226. $15.00.
In a refreshingly candid and incisive fashion, Justice Richard
Neely, of the Supreme Court of West Virginia, strips our system of
government naked, and describes How Courts Govern America' by
necessity. "In elected politics, the legislature and executive take
idealistic, energetic, ambitious young men and turn them into
whores in five years; the judiciary takes good, old, tired, exper-
ienced whores and turns them into virgins in five years."2 "While a
relative absence of graft helps the judiciary, its distinguishing fea-
ture is the absence of the sophisticated political and institutional
trading which so permeates the legislative and executive
branches."'
[W]hen the courts are going full speed at the lawmaking business, they still
try to limit their lawmaking to "general interest" law as opposed to "special
interest" law. . . .The difference between judges and legislators is that
judges can betray their benefactors without fear of future retribution and
usually, although not always, they do. . . .If judges did not engage in uni-
versal betrayal, some other neutral force would need to be invented.'
According to the author, "in any society there are two systems of
government - the myth system and the operational system."
'5
"The duty which we have unconsciously thrust upon the courts is
to get the results which the myth system promises but which the
operational system does not deliver; however, courts are absolutely
forbidden to call attention to the difference in the two systems or
in any way to threaten the myth system."6 In order to do this,
without addressing this "myth/operational disparity," of course, in
a discreet way, the judicial institution uses a code, quite acceptable
to law professors, such as the reasoning employed in Baker v.
1. R. NEELY, How CouRTs GOVERN AMERICA (1981).
2. Id. at 190.
3. Id. at 191.
4. Id. at 49.
5. Id. at 12 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
6. Id. at 13.
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Carr, expressing the "definitive" reasons why the judiciary must
provide relief in what was theretofore a "political question":
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding with-
out an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discre-
tion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of govern-
ment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political deci-
sion already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.'
The method principally employed in the "governing function" is
constitutional law:
[All law except constitutional law can be changed at any time by the legis-
lative branch of government; consequently, all the rules concerning con-
tracts, providing remedies for negligently inflicted injuries, and defining
crimes and their punishments, along with almost every other question which
a court ever decides, are open to legislative change at will. Courts spend
much time administering this routine type of law, and while they are fre-
quently criticized in individual cases for being wrong, stupid, or for deliber-
ately interpreting a piece of legislation in a perverse manner, their actions
in routine matters are seldom considered illegitimate, illegal, or usurpatory
because the state legislature or Congress can immediately rectify any mis-
take by changing the law.
However, when we come to constitutional law, the actions of courts are
almost entirely outside the control of the legislative branch.9
Setting the stage for judiciary rule is the nature of politics, thus,
says the author:
The widely held tenet of democratic faith that elected officials, as opposed
to bureaucrats or the judiciary, are popularly selected and democratically
responsive is largely a myth which gives a useful legitimacy to a system that
works relatively well in a society which has come to raise the ideal of de-
mocracy to the level of a religious creed. In fact, however, far from demo-
cratic control, the two most important forces in political life are indifference
and its direct byproduct, inertia. This is not irrational, because people want
first and foremost for the government to leave them the hell alone, and this
sentiment is pervasive among such disparate groups as captains of industry,
the solid middle class, and the majority of welfare clients.
[ . . T]he most compelling force in politics is inertia ....
7. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
8. Id. at 217.
9. R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 5.
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• . . Partisan controversy sets the county clerk against the prosecuting
attorney, the circuit judge at odds with the circuit clerk, the county com-
mission against the local sheriff and assessor, all in the interest of showing
what a bunch of rascals the opposition party is. The result is total lack of
cooperation, confusion, and deliberate torpedoing of major economic
projects, urban renewal, and any other program which might reflect credit
on the opposition.' 0
In essence, judges are actually "surrogate sovereigns," individu-
ally with absolute powers, but: "No individual judge has very much
power through the judicial lawmaking function. There is a hierar-
chy of courts, with appellate courts supervising trial courts . . .
The judiciary is the only branch of government which absolutely requires
that the person making a decision do his own work: the decision-maker
must personally sit on the bench, hear oral arguments, listen to the testi-
mony of witnesses, make his own findings of fact and law, and ultimately
sign his own name to the order rendering a decision.1 2
The author compares the courts to the legislature, bureaucracy,
and executive functions well, indeed. Regarding the legislature, "a
legislature cannot be designed which will pass good legislation in a
timely manner and simultaneously prevent the passage of danger-
ous legislation. 13 The reason for this is the nature of the institu-
tion itself. Courts, by their nature as an institution, have less rea-
son to "trade for one's own account." Courts, importantly, also do
not control their own dockets, as do the legislatures.
As for the bureaucracy:
There are roughly three million civil service jobs in the federal merit sys-
tem of which none is elected. In fact, in the entire federal executive branch,
there are but two elected officials, the president and vice president. In the
state governments, there are usually, in addition to the governor, a few
statewide elected officials variously called treasurers, comptrollers, auditors,
commissioners, attorneys general, or superintendents, all with executive du-
ties. However, even where there are numerous statewide elected officials in
the state executive branch, the majority of the state civil servants, ranging
from five thousand to hundreds of thousands, depending on the state, are
responsible to the governor.
The myth of democratic control becomes even more ironic when it is
remembered that in addition to the ratios of elected officials to civil service
employees, neither presidents nor governors select the civil service; its mem-
bers are passed on from administration to administration.
4
10. Id. at 25-27.
11. Id. at 191.
12. Id. at 201.
13. Id. at 47-48.
14. Id. at 80.
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Indeed, says the author:
The pervasive desire to get as many functions as possible out of politics
creates board after board and converts local elected officials into appointees
at an ever accelerating pace. The war cry of "democratic control" is usually
invoked after a particular function has been "depoliticized"; whenever a
function is directly in the hands of elected politicians the complaint is uni-
versally heard that a given function has become "political," by which is
meant that the officials exercising the control are either incompetent or
trading for their own accounts. Notwithstanding everyone's love of democ-
racy, there is almost universal agreement that the elective process brings a
higher number of incompetents and self-dealers to high positions than the
appointive process."
The legislature creates the myriad of agencies,
intentionally to remove them from political control.
...Since there is not obvious reason to believe that the agencies will be
wrong more often than the courts, why not let the agencies make the deci-
sions? . . .The answer to this criticism is that courts are not as likely to be
wrong as the agencies; while they are equally susceptible to human error,
they are almost immune from institutional error.16
The supervisory role of the courts, then, is actually to return the
bureaucracy to "political control"! "The answer lies in an analysis
of bureaucracies as institutions and a dissection of their inherent
institutional weaknesses. The intent of the courts' supervisory role
is to supply corrective balance to institutional weaknesses, al-
though legal scholars seldom speak in terms of social structure, but
rather of 'procedural due process.' -17 The way the courts do this
is:
First, the court can find procedural irregularity on the part of the agency,
such as failure to give notice, lack of a fair hearing, or inadequate findings
of fact to support the agency's conclusion. Second, if the agency has been
careful to protect its procedural flanks, the court can find the action by the
agency in excess of its authority, "arbitrary," or contrary to the weight of
the evidence. There are occasions, of course, where there is real procedural
irregularity or where an agency does act in excess of its authority; however,
most of the reversals which cause public outcry occur because the court dis-
agrees with the agency's policy and finds some procedural device on which
to turn its ruling.1'
Agencies, "[w]hile they are not tempted to individual self-deal-
ing in the same way that elected political officials are, they are
15. Id. at 87 (emphasis in original).
16. Id. at 81 (emphasis in original).




nonetheless tempted to institutional self-dealing, that is, acting in
such a way as to further the ends of the bureaucracy as a whole." 1'
In my view, the following is representative of the tone of the
author:
Implicit in the whole structure of court control of administrative action is
society's desire to remove important decision making from the hands of ad-
ministrators and place it in the hands of politicians. To refer to judges as
'politicians' may seem silly in light of the lengths to which we go to 'de-
politicize' courts, but the term politician in this context does not connote
partisan or ideological politics, but merely experience with the entire body
politic. Judges are judges because of politics, either by being elected or by
being appointed. Furthermore, most judges are first appointed in their late
forties, which means that the majority of sitting judges are in their middle
fifties. They have seen a great deal and had considerable experience: they
have defended innocent people against a corrupt system; they have repre-
sented struggling businesses against arrogant regulators; they have repre-
sented the consumer against the powerful predators of American industry;
they have represented the government against organized crime; and, fre-
quently, they have represented organized crime against the government.
The day-to-day practice of law is an inherently unintellectual undertak-
ing, which may be why the results in reported cases are frequently more
satisfactory than the reasoning. Good judges often intuit the correct result,
although they may not be able to articulate their reasons in terms of theo-
retical structures which would be satisfying to law professors. By the time a
good trial lawyer has practiced for twenty-five years, he has about seen it
all. If he is any good, the stereotypes which he learned at university no
longer impress themselves upon his imagination, and he understands that
there are two sides to every issue. Concisely stated, he has learned to hate a
little less.
The same, of course, is true of elected politicians and high appointed offi-
cials; however, they are not in control of the day-to-day operation of govern-
ment. A G.S. 15 government executive is almost, by definition, devoid of
broad-based experience, because if he had not spent his entire life in a par-
ticular bureaucracy, he would not be a G.S. 15. The purpose of placing ulti-
mate responsibility for administrative action into the hands of the courts,




As for the "non-political" bureaucrat-"the affairs of much of
the country are inevitably managed to some degree by a group of
people who consider areas west of the Hudson, except California,
as Indian country." 1 "What happens when high staff positions are
19. Id. at 83.
20. Id. at 110-111 (emphasis in original).
21. Id. at 104.
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filled with the inordinately arrogant graduates of the Yale and
Harvard law schools who have been trained that they have a mo-
nopoly on, not only all the intellect, but all the morality as well?
'22
[T]he courts are peculiarly suited to combatting bureaucratic self-deal-
ing. . . . [C]ourts are able to shift the responsibility for truly important de-
cisions away from young, Ivy League-trained but inexperienced lawyers and
administrators into the hands of older, more experienced, and more truly
representative persons from all over America who have no institutional
stake in the outcome of any given issue.
. . . The essential mission of the courts in bringing the myth system and
operational system into alignment involves supplying balance.
20
The role of the courts is accepted because:
American courts enjoy greater prestige than any other American govern-
mental institution, and I believe it is because the average American intuits
the functional justification for court intervention in the political process.
The average American may not be able to explain the mechanics of how a
political machine can cheat him of his economic, civil, and political rights,
but he knows that the machines are out there ready to take him to the
cleaners unless courts or some other institution besides elected politicians
provide protection.
24
Only a supreme court justice with guts would admit what is so
true -
I have seen countless administrative appeals where the records amounted
to twenty thousand pages, yet I know of no judge who ever read such a
record in its entirety. . . . In administrative appeals, however, the factual
issues are secondary to the social and political perspective from which those
facts are viewed. If that is the case, then we can do the world a great favor
by admitting it.28
As for judicial selection, the justice observes -
What is a "better quality" appointee? If federal judges are no longer ap-
pointed through the political patronage system (which has substantial
checks against gross incompetence, such as a required Justice Department
investigation, bar association evaluation and recommendation, and Senate
confirmation), how are they to be appointed? If state bar associations are to
do it, they will obviously suggest lawyers who have been active in the bar.
Bar associations, like other committees and clubs, are run by small groups
of active members. Usually these lawyers come from big firms with big cli-
ents who subsidize participation in bar activities. Are these people necessa-
rily better candidates than the rough-and-tumble lawyers who are involved
22. Id. at 106.
23. Id. at 113.
24. Id. at 144.




* . . I have further observed that on the federal bench, where all judges
are appointed, those who come from day-to-day politics maintain a higher
level of civility, consideration, and gentlemanly conduct in their courts than
those who come from United States senator bosom-buddyhood or sugges-
tion by anonymous committees. The correlation between good judging and
extensive political background is strong.2
All in all, I consider this one of the best works on government I
have ever read - it is required reading for anyone now in the sys-
tem or anticipating being part of it.
Indeed, a mastery of this analysis would well be a much better
alternative to one interested in pursuit of a career in law than two
years of law school.
The Honorable John P. Flaherty*
26. Id. at 214-15.
*Associate Justice, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
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